This he can do by a combination of three methods :—

(a) Extension of the front of the divisions in the line. (The British Army seems to take *HowHaig* ^s course only with a certain *could meet* timidity, seeing that it counts on *Nivelle s* holding a front which does not amount *request* tQ a quarter Qf ^ totaj front> with a number of divisions superior to that which we use ourselves for holding the remainder of the front, although our divisions are much inferior in effectives to the English divisions.)

(2) Provisional reduction in their reserves, without there resulting any difficulty for them in taking part in the spring offensives, under the conditions agreed on.

(3) Reinforcement by fresh divisions coming from England.

It is undeniable that the co-operation which we are asking from the British Army is relatively much less than that which we are undertaking on our part; it is perfectly reconcilable with the special ulterior projects of the English Command which cannot in any case be put in hand before the summer.

The finding of a solution of these questions becomes a matter of special urgency, since according to the decisions taken at the last meeting of the

Inter-Allied
Time factor General Staffs held at Chantilly, we ought
vital to be ready for any eventuality by the end of
the fast fortnight of February. The fears
which have been manifested with regard to the
Swiss Frontier make it necessary for us
on the other